Articles — Deep Dives into Anonymity, Privacy, and Security
This page collects in-depth articles written by our team on essential topics for anyone navigating the darknet or seeking to improve their digital privacy. Each article is designed to be practical, technically accurate, and immediately actionable. We also link to high-quality external articles and resources throughout each piece for readers who want to explore topics further. These are not surface-level overviews — they are substantive guides written for people who take their privacy seriously.
VPN vs Tor — Which One Should You Use and When
The question of whether to use a VPN, Tor, or both is one of the most frequently asked in privacy circles, and the answer depends entirely on your threat model, your use case, and the specific adversary you are trying to defend against. The two technologies are fundamentally different in architecture, trust model, and the type of protection they provide. Conflating them — or blindly combining them — can actually reduce your security rather than enhance it.
A Virtual Private Network creates an encrypted tunnel between your device and a VPN server operated by the VPN provider. All your internet traffic passes through this tunnel, meaning your ISP can see that you are connected to a VPN but cannot see what you are doing. The destination website sees the VPN server's IP address rather than yours. This provides meaningful protection against your ISP and against casual network surveillance, but it requires absolute trust in the VPN provider. The provider can see all your traffic, and despite "no-logs" policies advertised by most commercial VPNs, there is no way to independently verify these claims. Multiple VPN providers have been caught logging user data despite promising otherwise, and court records show that law enforcement regularly obtains data from VPN companies through legal process.
Tor operates on a fundamentally different trust model. Instead of trusting a single provider, Tor distributes trust across thousands of independently operated relays. No single relay sees both who you are and what you are doing. This means there is no single entity you must trust with your complete traffic — the system is designed to provide anonymity even if some relays are compromised or malicious. The trade-off is performance: Tor is significantly slower than a VPN because traffic must traverse multiple relays around the world.
For general privacy against your ISP and casual surveillance, a reputable VPN is sufficient and provides better performance. For anonymity against sophisticated adversaries — intelligence agencies, law enforcement, or well-resourced corporate investigators — Tor is the appropriate tool. For the highest level of protection, Tor can be used in conjunction with a VPN, but the order matters. Running Tor over a VPN (connecting to a VPN first, then launching Tor) hides your Tor usage from your ISP but exposes it to the VPN provider. Running a VPN over Tor (using Tor first, then connecting to a VPN through Tor) is technically more complex but hides your real IP even from the VPN provider. Each configuration has specific use cases, advantages, and risks that should be thoroughly understood before implementation.
Further Reading
PGP Encryption Basics — Securing Your Communications
Pretty Good Privacy remains one of the most important cryptographic tools available to individuals. Created by Phil Zimmermann in 1991 and released as free software, PGP was revolutionary because it brought military-grade encryption to ordinary people. The US government actually investigated Zimmermann for "exporting munitions" because at the time, strong cryptography was classified alongside weapons under export control laws. That investigation was eventually dropped, and PGP became the foundation of secure communication for journalists, activists, businesses, and anyone else who needed to keep their messages private.
PGP uses a combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption. When you encrypt a message with PGP, the software generates a random session key and uses it to encrypt the message content using a fast symmetric cipher (like AES). It then encrypts the session key itself using the recipient's public key (asymmetric encryption using RSA or ECC). The encrypted session key and the encrypted message are sent together. The recipient uses their private key to decrypt the session key, which is then used to decrypt the message. This hybrid approach combines the speed of symmetric encryption with the convenience of asymmetric key management.
Key management is where most PGP users make mistakes. Your private key must be stored securely — if someone obtains your private key and its passphrase, they can decrypt all messages sent to you and forge your signature. Best practices include storing your private key on an encrypted drive or a hardware security module, using a strong passphrase (not just a password), setting an expiration date on your keys so compromised keys become useless over time, and generating a revocation certificate immediately after creating your key pair so you can revoke the key if it is compromised.
In the darknet context, PGP serves several specific functions beyond general message encryption. It is used for identity verification (a vendor's PGP key is their persistent identity across platforms), two-factor authentication (decrypting a PGP-encrypted challenge to prove account ownership), mirror verification (signed mirror lists prove authenticity), and dead drops (publishing encrypted messages to public forums that only the intended recipient can read). Mastering PGP is not optional for serious darknet users — it is a fundamental requirement.
Further Reading
Getting Started with Tails OS — The Amnesic System
Tails (The Amnesic Incognito Live System) is a portable operating system specifically designed for privacy and anonymity. It boots from a USB drive, runs entirely in RAM, routes all internet connections through the Tor network, and when shut down, leaves absolutely no trace on the computer that was used. This combination of properties makes Tails the recommended operating system for high-risk activities where digital forensic evidence could have serious consequences.
Getting started with Tails requires a USB drive with at least 8 GB of storage. The installation process involves downloading the Tails image from the official website (tails.net), verifying its cryptographic signature to ensure it has not been tampered with, and writing the image to the USB drive using the recommended tool for your operating system (Etcher on all platforms or the GNOME Disks utility on Linux). Once the USB is prepared, you boot your computer from it by entering the BIOS/UEFI boot menu (usually by pressing F12, F2, or Delete during startup) and selecting the USB drive.
When Tails boots, you are presented with a welcome screen where you can set optional configurations: enabling an administration password (necessary for installing additional software during the session), configuring MAC address spoofing (which changes your network adapter's hardware identifier to prevent tracking), and setting up a network bridge (useful in countries where Tor is blocked). After configuration, the desktop environment loads — a modified GNOME desktop with the Tor Browser, Thunderbird email client, KeePassXC password manager, and a suite of other privacy tools pre-installed and pre-configured.
Tails includes a feature called Persistent Storage that allows you to save selected data across sessions on an encrypted partition of the USB drive. This is useful for storing PGP keys, password databases, network settings, and other data you need regularly. Persistent Storage uses LUKS encryption and requires a passphrase to unlock. It is important to understand that while Persistent Storage survives reboots, anything stored outside the persistent volume — browser history, temporary files, application state — is erased when Tails shuts down.
Common mistakes when using Tails include accessing personal accounts (which links your anonymous session to your real identity), using the same USB for Tails and regular file storage, ignoring Tails update notifications (outdated versions may have known vulnerabilities), and using Tails on a computer that is under physical surveillance. Tails protects against digital forensics and network surveillance, but it cannot protect against a camera pointed at your screen or a compromised keyboard.
Further Reading
Operational Security Fundamentals for Darknet Users
Operational security — commonly abbreviated as OPSEC — is the practice of identifying and protecting critical information that could be used to compromise your anonymity, safety, or objectives. In the darknet context, OPSEC is not a specific tool or technique but a comprehensive mindset and discipline that must inform every action you take online. The vast majority of darknet arrests and deanonymizations result not from broken encryption or compromised software but from human operational security failures.
The foundation of OPSEC is compartmentalization — the strict separation of your anonymous activities from your real identity. This means never accessing personal accounts (email, social media, banking) from the same device or session used for darknet activities. It means never using the same usernames, passwords, writing style, or behavioral patterns across your real and anonymous identities. It means never discussing details of your anonymous activities with people who know your real identity, and never revealing personal details to people who know only your anonymous identity.
Technical compartmentalization extends this principle to hardware and software. Ideally, darknet activities should be conducted on a dedicated device that is used for nothing else. This device should run an anonymous operating system (Tails or Whonix), connect to the internet through a network that is not associated with your real identity (a public WiFi network accessed without revealing your face to surveillance cameras), and be stored securely when not in use. For maximum security, some practitioners use pre-paid, anonymously purchased hardware that can be destroyed if compromised.
Metadata is often more dangerous than content. Even if you encrypt every message perfectly, the metadata — who you communicate with, when, how often, and for how long — can reveal patterns that compromise your anonymity. Law enforcement has successfully deanonymized darknet users by correlating the times they were online with timezone-specific patterns, linking anonymous forum posts to real identities through writing style analysis (stylometry), and tracing cryptocurrency transactions despite mixing efforts. Defending against metadata analysis requires awareness of what metadata you generate and deliberate steps to minimize and obfuscate it.
The weakest link in any OPSEC chain is human psychology. Complacency after months or years of successful anonymous operation, the desire to brag about activities or knowledge, emotional reactions that override careful procedures, and the gradual relaxation of security practices over time have all contributed to compromised anonymity. The most effective OPSEC practitioners treat their security procedures as non-negotiable routines rather than optional precautions, maintaining the same level of discipline on their thousandth session as on their first.
Further Reading
Bitcoin Privacy — Understanding Blockchain Analysis and Countermeasures
Bitcoin's relationship with privacy is paradoxical. On one hand, Bitcoin enables transactions without requiring a bank account, government ID, or any personally identifying information. On the other hand, every Bitcoin transaction ever made is permanently recorded on a public blockchain that anyone can inspect. This transparency, which is essential to Bitcoin's security model, creates a comprehensive financial surveillance system that would be the envy of any authoritarian government. Understanding this paradox — and the tools available to mitigate it — is essential for anyone using cryptocurrency in privacy-sensitive contexts.
Blockchain analysis companies like Chainalysis, Elliptic, and CipherTrace have built sophisticated systems for tracing Bitcoin transactions. Their techniques go far beyond simply following the flow of funds from one address to another. They employ heuristic clustering (grouping addresses likely controlled by the same entity based on transaction patterns), cross-reference blockchain data with known entities (exchanges, services, seized wallets), analyze transaction timing patterns, and leverage information from data breaches, forum posts, and other open sources to link addresses to real-world identities. Law enforcement agencies worldwide subscribe to these services, and they have been instrumental in dozens of darknet market investigations.
CoinJoin is one of the most effective Bitcoin privacy techniques. It works by combining multiple users' transactions into a single transaction with multiple inputs and outputs, making it difficult to determine which input funded which output. Tools like Wasabi Wallet and JoinMarket implement CoinJoin in user-friendly ways. Wasabi Wallet's implementation, called WabiSabi, is particularly notable for its coordinator-based approach that automates the mixing process while using cryptographic techniques to prevent even the coordinator from learning which inputs map to which outputs.
Monero (XMR) represents a fundamentally different approach to cryptocurrency privacy. Rather than adding privacy as an optional layer on top of a transparent blockchain (as CoinJoin does for Bitcoin), Monero builds privacy into the protocol itself. Every Monero transaction uses ring signatures (mixing the spender's output with others to obscure the true source), stealth addresses (generating unique one-time addresses for each transaction to prevent linking), and RingCT (hiding transaction amounts). These features are mandatory for all transactions, meaning the entire Monero blockchain is opaque — privacy is the default, not an opt-in feature.
The choice between Bitcoin with privacy tools and Monero depends on your specific requirements. Bitcoin has far greater liquidity, wider acceptance, and a more mature ecosystem of services. However, its privacy tools are opt-in, imperfect, and require active effort to use correctly. Monero provides stronger privacy guarantees by default but has lower liquidity, fewer on-ramps and off-ramps, and faces potential delisting from exchanges due to regulatory pressure. For maximum privacy, some users convert Bitcoin to Monero (using atomic swaps or privacy-respecting exchanges), conduct their transactions in Monero, and convert back to Bitcoin only when needed for services that do not accept Monero.
Further Reading
External Articles Worth Reading
Beyond our own articles, these external resources provide excellent coverage of privacy, anonymity, and security topics from trusted sources.